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I.

INTRODUCTION

This is the reply brief of the Citizens Against Linscott/Interstate Asphalt Plant
("Citizens"). On appeal, Citizens challenges the District Court's affirmation of the final agency
action of the Bonner County Board of Commissioners ("Bonner County" or "Board").
On July 22, 2020, Citizens filed its Opening Brief ("Citizens' Opening Brief'). 1
The

Respondent/Cross-Appellant

Bonner

County

and

the

Intervenor/Cross-Appellants

(collectively "Respondents") collectively have filed three briefs in response to Citizens' Opening
Brief: (1) Bonner County's Respondent's Brief ("Bonner County Response"); (2) Interstate
Concrete and Asphalt Company's Cross-Appellant's Brief ("Interstate Response"); and
(3) Linscotts' Intervenors' Respondents' and Cross Appellants' Brief ("Linscotts Response" and
collectively, the "Response Briefs"). Because the Response Briefs are aligned in position and
largely aligned in their arguments, Citizens submits this single reply brief to address all of them
rather than submit individual replies to each of them.
Despite the Response Briefs' efforts to obfuscate the case, the issue before the
Court is narrow: Did the District Court err by upholding the CUP and Decision because the CUP
was dependent on a void ordinance and because the CUP and Decision failed to account for the
Gravel Pit's illegal non-conforming use? The District Court did so err, and Citizens had standing
to challenge and did seek timely review of the CUP and Decision.

1

Unless otherwise indicated, capitalized terms used in this brief have the same meanings as in
Citizens' Opening Brief.
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The Response Briefs focus primarily on alleged procedural infirmities in Citizens'
Petition that were all correctly rejected by the District Court and all ask this Court to adopt an
hyper-technical-and in any event, an incorrect-view of the relevant rules and statutes as
opposed to deciding the case on the merits. Beyond that, the Response Briefs ask this Court to
ignore longstanding precedent and allow the Decision to stand despite is dependence on an
ordinance that is void as a matter of law.
Nothing in the Response Briefs changes the fact that the CUP was unlawfully
issued because it was dependent on an illegally adopted ordinance amendment, and otherwise
violates Bonner County's Zoning Ordinance.

II.

ARGUMENT

Citizens asks that this Court overturn an agency action and resulting CUP that
were dependent upon both a void ordinance on the one hand, and on the other, an arbitrary and
capricious reading of the ordinances on which it did rely. Either ground is sufficient on its own to
decide in Citizens' favor. Citizens timely brought and properly maintained this case based on its
associational standing, and any alleged failure of service was harmless error. Each point is
addressed in tum.

A.

The Decision And Cup Are Improper Because They Were Dependent On A Void
Ordinance And An Arbitrary Interpretation Of An Ordinance.
The Amendment has always been void and Citizens properly raised that issue

before the District Court and before this Court. Citizens also properly raised the issue of the
Voiding Judgment before this Court based on the relevant statute and rules. But even if the
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Amendment were not void-it is-the Decision and CUP are improper because they fail to
account for the non-conforming use provisions of the Ordinance.
1.

The Amendment is void.

As is discussed in Citizens' Opening Brief (pgs. 19-22), the County failed to
provide the public with adequate notice of the Amendment's provisions before adopting it. That
renders the Amendment's adoption unlawful and the Amendment itself void. In order to
conclusively reflect the Amendment's being unlawful and void, the District Court for Bonner
County has issued the Voiding Judgment and Voiding Order unequivocally declaring the
Amendment void. Opening Brief, Appendices 1, 2.
The Response Briefs argue that the Voiding Judgment has no bearing on this case
because it is not properly before this Court,2 because the Amendment is not actually void,3 or
because an applicant's rights under a CUP dependent on a void ordinance somehow vest at the
time of the application also dependent on the void ordinance. 4 They are wrong on all fronts.
First, the Voiding Judgment is valid and unchallenged and constitutes the law of
this state. It was not in the record below because it did not exist at the time. This Court can and
should consider it now by taking judicial notice of it under either Idaho Code section 9-101(3)
(as a legislative fact) or under Idaho Rule of Evidence 201 (as an adjudicative fact). The

2

Interstate's Response at 15-16; Linscotts' Response at 15-16.

3

Interstate' s Response at 17.

4

Interstate's Response at 17-19; Linscotts' Response at 16-18; County's Response at 17-21.
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opposing parties did not grapple with the concept of judicial notice, and Citizens will simply
refer the Court to its briefing on the subject on page 8 of its Opening Brief (n. 3) rather than
repeat it here. Suffice it to say, this Court can and should take judicial notice of the Voiding
Judgment and is permitted to do so at any stage of the proceedings. State v. Lemmons, 158 Idaho
971, 978, 354 P.3d 1186, 1193 (2015) (W. Jones, J., specially concurring and noting that "this
Court can take judicial notice now"); see also Trautman v. Hill, 116 Idaho 337, 340, 775 P.2d
651, 654 (Ct. App. 1989) (noting that appellate courts can properly take judicial notice of
adjudicative facts).
Second, Interstate's attempt to collaterally attack the Voiding Judgment fails.
Interstate's Response at 17. A validly entered judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction is
not subject to collateral attack. See State v. Heyrend, 129 Idaho 568, 571, 929 P.2d 744, 747
(Ct. App. 1996) (parties generally cannot collaterally attack a judgment entered in another case
unless the attack is based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
Third, the Decision and CUP did not vest any rights in any party. Bonner County,
the Linscotts, and Interstate all rely heavily on the argument that the Linscotts' mere application
somehow vested their rights under the CUP based on the language of the ordinances at the time
of application. None of the Respondents have ever raised this argument before, including in their
filings and pleadings before the District Court and they should not be allowed to raise it here.
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But even if this Court considers their argument, it is circular and incorrect. If true,
that argument would prohibit a party from ever asserting the invalidity of an ordinance in
opposing a CUP or other land use decision. Accepting that position would mean that for a party
to oppose a CUP application because of an invalid ordinance, the party would already have to
have litigated and won a lawsuit to have the ordinance determined invalid before the application

is even filed.
How could any party be expected to challenge every ordinance they think might
be invalid-and pay for all the challenges-on the off chance that someone in the future might
apply for a CUP dependent on any of those ordinances? They cannot. Nor would they necessarily
have standing to do so. In any case, Citizens are not a funded group of activists who can monitor
the County's improper ordinances on a full time basis. They are a group of concerned citizens
funding a lawsuit from their own pockets in their spare time to stop an illegal asphalt Batch Plant
from being built in their back yards.
Fortunately for the Citizens, the Linscotts' rights under the CUP did not vest at
the time they applied under an invalid ordinance, and the case law cited in the Response Briefs to
that effect is inapposite. None of the cases cited in the Response Briefs discuss an application
made under an ordinance later invalidated. Instead, they all deal with the concept that a local
government does not have the right to stall on an application amend the relevant ordinance while
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the application is pending, and then deny the application based on the amended ordinance. 5 That
is not what happened here, and does not give the Linscotts the right to cling to an invalid
ordinance simply because it was still on the books at the time of application. The distinction isat least implicitly-recognized in Interstate's Response, when it points out that part of the
justification for the Ben Lomond decision is that "legislation acts prospectively only[.]"
Interstate's Response at 18. Interstate is right that legislation acts prospectively, 6 so Bonner
County could not have refused to decide the Linscotts' otherwise proper application to buy time
to amend the relevant ordinances to then later deny the application. But invalidation of
legislation-like what occurred here-is not prospective. The voiding of an ordinance is
expressly retroactive to the time of adoption under Idaho's case law.
Hillman v. City of Pocatello is clear. "[An] ordinance when passed being void, it

remains void, and it cannot be given life or effect by acts or conduct of appellant ... There being
no authority for the enactment of the ordinance in question, it never had and does not now have
any validity." 74 Idaho 69, 72, 256 P.2d 1072, 1073 (1953). This remains good law, which

5

For example, in Ben Lomond, Inc. v. City of Idaho Falls, 92 Idaho 595, 598, 448 P.2d 209, 212
(1968), Idaho Falls refused to decide Ben Lomond, Inc.'s building application because the city was
"holding up all building permits until a new zoning ordinance was enacted[.]" While the application was
pending, the City annexed new land and passed new zoning ordinances upon which it denied the
application. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court broke from a majority of other states to hold that Ben Lomond,
Inc., was not bound by the new ordinances, but was instead entitled to review under the ordinances in
place at the time of his application. Id. 92 Idaho at 600-01, 488 P.2d at 214-15. Notably, the Court was
careful to point out that Ben Lomond, Inc., was "entitled to a building permit" at the time of his
application and careful to limit its holding regarding vested rights to "such situation[.]"
6

Interstate is incorrect when it asserts that legislation "only" acts prospectively. See e.g. Guzman v.
Piercy, 155 Idaho 928, 938, 318 P.3d 918, 928 (2014) (discussing when statutes apply retroactively).
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Bonner County concedes when it asks this Court to "affirmatively limit" the case's holding.
Bonner County Response at 20. Contrary to the assertions of the Response Briefs, this Court
does not need to limit the holding of Hillman based on upon the Ben Lomond line of cases.
Linscotts' rights under the CUP cannot have vested because the CUP was issued based on a void
ordinance and because Citizens timely and correctly challenged the CUP's issuance. Therefore,
no "vested" rights are violated by this Court recognizing that the Amendment is and always was
void. In fact, taking that argument to its logical extreme would mean that no party could ever
challenge an issued CUP-the rights would have become "vested" at the time of application.
This is not the state of the law, and Hillman should be upheld.

2.

The Amendment has always been void.
Nothing in the Response Briefs changes the fact that, even without the Voiding

Judgment, the District Court should have considered, and this Court should consider, whether the
Amendment is void in examining the validity of the CUP and Decision. Citizens discussed this in
more detail in its Opening Brief (pgs. 20-22), and will not reiterate that position here. The
subtlety that has eluded Linscotts and Interstate is that nothing in the underlying proceedings
would have resulted in a judicial declaration deeming the Amendment invalid.
The District Court could have found that the Amendment was not lawful and
therefore concluded that the CUP, which was dependent on the Amendment, is improper. That
would not result in the invalidation of the Amendment and was therefore proper to raise below
and here. Consider a criminal statute that a misdemeanor defendant argues is void for vagueness.
If the magistrate court accepts the defendant's argument, the result is a dismissal of the charges
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against the defendant, not a declaration that the statute itself is invalid. The latter may be true,
but it will not end up on the resulting judgment in the case. The Amendment here has always
been void, and this Court can determine that from the record available to it in this case.

3.

The Decision erred in saying the non-conforming status of the Gravel Pit was
not at issue-in fact, the Gravel Pit was not a lawful non-conforming use and
that status was directly at issue.
Contrary to the Linscotts and Interstate' s assertions, the Decision did not

determine that the Batch Plant would be within an active gravel pit. The Board improperly
sidestepped that critical determination and simply said it was "not in question" (A.R. 1008). That
was improper, and no amount of argument that the Board's prior determinations apply changes
that.
The Board's planning director was affirmatively prohibited from issuing the CUP
"unless" it complied "in all respects" with the Bonner County Revised Code. BCRC § 12-130.A.
The Board had an affirmative duty to find that the Gravel Plant complied with the nonconforming use ordinance (BCRC § 12-341.A), and it was error for it to say the that issue was
"not in question[.]" (A.R. 1008).
Interstate is incorrect when it says that the Board approved the non-conforming
use of the Gravel Pit. E.g. Interstate' s Response at 13. Instead of approving it, the County
Commissioners acknowledged the strength of the evidence that the Gravel Pit violated the nonconforming use requirements by pointing out the "great arguments" about the operation of the
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Gravel Pit,7 and the "valid arguments with respect to the quarry[.]" 8 In an (unlawful) attempt to
avoid having to grapple with Citizens' arguments, the Board simply decided to shirk its duties
and (unlawfully) declare the matter "not in question[.]" (A.R. 1008) Citizens will not repeat their
extensive recitation of evidence in the record regarding the non-compliance of the Gravel Pit, but
will instead incorporate the same here by reference to their Opening Brief (pgs. 26-33).
The Linscotts' argument regarding the inapplicable doctrine of diminishing assets
fares no better. Linscotts Response at 21. The Linscotts acknowledge that the doctrine is not the
law in Idaho. 9 Linscotts Response at 29. But what they ignore is that such a doctrine could not
apply in this case, as it would run contrary to both Bonner County ordinances and to Idaho's well
settled precedent such as Baxter v. Preston 10 and its progeny. It may very well be the case in
Washington state that a non-conforming use may become vested and defeat a subsequent zoning
limitation. So what? Unfortunately for the Respondents, this is an Idaho case involving property
in Idaho, and in Idaho, Baxter provides clear authority for the County to restrict the enlargement,

7

March Hearing Transcript at p. 64, 1. 5 (A.R. 1361.)

8

March Hearing Transcript at p. 64, 11. 6-7 (A.R. 1361.)

9

The Linscotts also assert without authority that "most state Courts" have adopted this doctrine,
despite citing a single state court case from Washington. Linscotts Response at 21. Because the Linscotts
have failed to support this assertion with authority, this Court cannot consider the argument. Bach v.
Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 790, 229 P.3d 1146, 1152 (2010) ("We will not consider an issue not supported
by argument and authority in the opening brief." (internal quotation omitted)).
10

115 Idaho 607, 768 P.2d 1340 (1989). As discussed in Citizens' Opening Brief(pg. 30-31), Baxter
provides that an expansion can be so great in the aggregate that it constitutes a non-conforming use.
Baxter, 115 Idaho at 610-11, 768 P.2d at 1343-44.

PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF - 9

expansion, extension or alteration of a nonconforming use as discussed in Citizens' Opening
Brief (pgs. 30-31 ).
B.

Citizens' Petition was Procedurally Proper.
The bulk of the Respondents' arguments in this case have always been technical

procedural arguments. The first real action in this case was Bonner County's motion to dismiss
the case because it was untimely filed. (R. 24-33.) The District Court correctly denied that
motion, but the Linscotts have insisted on raising it at almost every stage of this proceeding, 11
and Bonner County and Interstate have raised the argument before this Court. As
P.G. Wodehouse put it, their "whole attitude recalled irresistibly to the mind that of some
assiduous hound who will persist in laying a dead rat on the drawing-room carpet, though
repeatedly apprised by word and gesture that the market for same is sluggish or even nonexistent." P.G. WODEHOUSE, THE CODE OF THE WOOSTERS, pp. 7-8 (Double Day, Doran, 1938).
The procedural arguments raised here fare no better than they ever have. As the
District Court correctly found, Citizens' Petition was not untimely, there was no meaningful
failure to serve Interstate and Linscotts, and Citizens properly have standing to bring this action.
(R. 288-91.)

11

(E.g. R. 222-29.)
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1.

Citizens' Petition was timely.
a.

Citizens actual filing of the Petition was timely.

Citizens electronically filed its Petition through the iCourt system within the
required twenty-eight (28) days, by April 19, 2019. The filing met all the applicable
requirements for a petition for judicial review. As discussed below, it was initially rejected by
the clerk's office for failure to include a civil cover sheet, a requirement that does not apply to a
petition for judicial review, which is not a "civil action" that requires a cover sheet. Thus, the
filing clearly met the requirement of Rule 84(n) that the petition be "physically file[ d]" with the
District Court to avoid a jurisdictional time bar. A proper electronic submission to the iCourt
system undoubtedly meets this requirement. Attorneys "must electronically file documents in
courts where electronic filing has been mandated" such as the First Judicial District Court for
Bonner County, Idaho. Rule (b )(1 )(A) of the Idaho Rules for Electronic Filing and Service
("Filing Rule"). 12 Therefore, Rule 84(n) cannot be construed to require paper or "conventional"
filing, because that would place Rule 84 in conflict with the Filing Rule. "The literal wording of
a statute cannot be honored if it creates unreasonable, absurd results." Verska v. Saint Alphonsus
Reg'! Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889,894,265 P.3d 502, 507 (2011) (internal quotation omitted).

12

The Idaho Rules for Electronic Filing and Service were not effective until July 1, 2019. At the
time, electronic filing was governed by the Rule on Electronic Filing and Service which was adopted and
ordered by this Court in its March 26, 2018, In Re: Order Amending Rule on Electronic Filing and
Service, signed by Chief Justice Roger S. Burdick. This portion of the Filing Rule has been replaced by
I.R.E.F.S. 4(a)(l).
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Rule 84 does not require that an iCourt filing be accepted within the relevant time
limits, simply that it be filed. See I.R.C.P. 84. The iCourt system can take several days to accept
or reject a filing (see e.g., Filing Rule (e)(3)(B); I.R.E.F.S. 12) and Rule 84 says nothing about
acceptance or rejection being jurisdictional-the jurisdictional bar applies only to the physical
fling. Citizens timely performed that filing when they properly submitted the Initial Filing to the
iCourt system. A physical filing, once accomplished, is not undone because the clerk's office put
it in the wrong place or refused to file it. Extending that reasoning to the now-mandatory
electronic filing, the physical act of submitting a filing to the iCourt system, once accomplished,
is not undone because the iCourt system and/or the clerk's office erroneously rejected the filing.
The date the document was physically filed remains the same, which is the sole consideration of
the jurisdictional bar in Rule 84(n). "The electronic filing of a document is accomplished when a
filer submits a document electronically to the court and the electronic filing system receives the
document." Filing Rule (e)(1 )(A) (emphasis added).
Filing Rule (b )(7) indicates that a document not corrected as requested "will be
deemed to have not been filed." That provision does not mandate dismissal of this case for
several reasons. First, as discussed above, whether or not the clerk's office accepts or rejects a
timely filing has no bearing on the date the document was physically filed under Rule 84(n). The
Filing Rule governs when and how documents are "electronically filed" but do not supersede
Rule 84(n)'s mandate regarding documents being "physically filed." Idaho Supreme Court Order
In Re: Order Amending Rule of Electronic Filing and Service, March 26, 2018 (ordering that
"the terms of the attached [Filing Rule] as it relates to electronic filing, electronic service and
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the electronic trial courts shall prevail" but remaining silent as to physical filing (emphasis

added)). So the Filing Rule's deeming a document not having been electronically filed has no
impact on whether it was "physically filed" pursuant to Rule 84(n).
Further, and perhaps more importantly, Filing Rule (b )(7) is inapplicable here
because the Initial Filing could not have been "corrected" as requested. The Initial Filing was
procedurally compliant and there were no lawful corrections to it that needed to be made, as
discussed below. Because there was no lawful correction required, the Initial Filing cannot have
been deemed not to have been filed.
The County criticizes the District Court for complying with its mandate to
interpret all rules in favor of serving the interests of justice (County's Response at 9), but in fact
that is exactly what it was required to do by rule. Rules 1(b) and 84(r) of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure mandate interpreting rules in favor of the just, speedy and inexpensive determination
of all petitions for judicial review.
It would not serve the interests of justice mandated by Rules 1(b) and 84(r) to

prohibit Citizens from proceeding with their timely filed action due to a quirk-which, as
discussed, was bought about by iCourt and/or the clerk's office-in a newly adopted electronic
filing system that still has bugs all of Idaho's legal professionals are working out together. This
Court should interpret the ambiguities in Rule 84 created by electronic filing system in favor of
cases being substantively heard rather than dismissed for a hiccup in the iCourt filing system,
especially where those cases were timely filed. For these reasons, Citizens' Petition was timely
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filed and should not be dismissed. The District Court was correct reaching this conclusion.
(R. 92-95.)

b.

The iCourt system improperly rejected Citizens' Initial Filing and
improperly prevented it from retaining the initial filing date.

Citizens' Initial Filing was rejected because it did not contain a civil cover sheet.
However, Citizens' Petition is and was not required to be accompanied by a civil cover sheet,
meaning that it was improperly rejected by the iCourt system and/or an employee of the court
clerk's office reviewing it. Civil cover sheets, or case information sheets, are required in "civil
action[s]" by Rule 3(d) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. I.R.C.P. 3(a), (d). But Citizens'
Petition for Judicial Review is expressly not a "civil action" and therefore not required to be filed
with a case information sheet. "Indeed, [this Court] ha[ s] often held that an administrative
appeal does not constitute a 'civil action' as defined by I.R.C.P. 3(a)." Euclid Ave. Tr. v. City of
Boise, 146 Idaho 306, 309, 193 P.3d 853, 856 (2008) (emphasis added) (internal quotation

omitted).
In Euclid Ave. Tr., a petitioner filed a "Complaint, Petition for Judicial Review
and Request for Jury Trial." Id., 146 Idaho at 308, 193 P.3d at 855. Boise City moved to dismiss
and for summary judgment, which the District Court granted. Id. This Court considered whether
truly civil claims (such as for damages and declaratory relief) could properly be brought in the
same action as a petition for judicial review. Id. This Court noted that petitions for judicial
review are not "civil actions" and went on to distinguish the two and ultimately conclude they
could not be brought together in the same action due to their differences:
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The separation of civil actions and administrative appeals is
supported by good policy underpinnings. After all, one proceeding
is appellate in nature and the other is an original action. They are
processed differently by our courts. Discovery is rarely available in
a judicial review proceeding. The review is to be conducted on the
record, absent specific authorization. I.C. § 67-5276. The
standards for determining an outcome are specified by statute
(LC. § 67-5279), whereas this is not the case with actions seeking
declaratory or monetary relief.
Euclid Ave. Tr., 146 Idaho at 309, 193 P.3d at 856.

Instead, administrative appeals such as this case are governed by Rule 84 and/or
the Idaho Appellate Rules. I.R.C.P. 84(a)(2) ("The procedure and standards of review applicable
to judicial review of state agency and local government actions must be as provided by statute. If
no stated procedure or standard of review is provided in the statute, then this rule provides the
procedure and standard of review by the district court."); I.R.C.P. 84(r) ("Any procedure for
judicial review not specified or covered by these rules must be in accordance with the
appropriate rule of the Idaho Appellate Rules to the extent not contrary to this Rule 84. This
Rule 84 must be construed to provide a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of all
petitions for review .... "). Nothing in either Rule 84 or the Idaho Appellate Rules requires filing
any sort of a civil cover sheet or case information sheet. See generally I.R.C.P. 84, Idaho
Appellate Rules. Therefore, Citizens' Initial Filing was procedurally proper and was improperly
rejected by the iCourt system and/or an employee of the court clerk's office.
As the Initial Filing complied with all requirements, the Court lacked authority to
reject it. Filing Rule (b )6 ("Documents that do not comply with this rule, or the requirements of

the aforementioned Electronic Filing Guide, or court policy, may be returned to the filer for
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correction" (emphasis added)). The Initial Filing complied with all these requirements, and the
requirements of Rule 84, but was still rejected. The District Court clerk and iCourt system were
beyond their authority to do so. In these circumstances, the Court must simply deem the filing to
have been completed on April 19. The District Court was bound by the Rules of Civil Procedure
as supplemented by the Filing Rule. LC. § 1-213 ("The Supreme Court shall prescribe, by
general rules, for all the courts of Idaho, the forms of process, writs, pleadings and motions, the
manner of service, time for appearance, and the practice and procedure in all actions and
proceedings." (emphasis added)); Idaho Supreme Court Order In Re: Order Amending Rule of
Electronic Filing and Service, March 26, 2018.
To the extent the Initial Filing was rejected due to a "technical" error, the Filing
Rule indicates that parties may obtain relief "if an error in the transmission of the document or
other technical problem prevents the electronic filing system from receiving a document." Filing
Rule (e)(5)(A). "Upon satisfactory proof of such an occurrence, the court shall permit the filing
date of the document to relate back to the date the filer first attempted to file the document to
meet filing requirements." Id. If in fact Citizens encountered such a technical error, they have
submitted proof sufficient to warrant this relief.
Citizens encountered an error on the part of the iCourt system and/or court clerk's
office that prevented their Initial Filing from being accepted by the iCourt system. When they
attempted to request that the filing date of the new submission relate back to the date of the
Initial Filing as provided by Filing Rule (e)(5)(A), the iCourt system would not allow them to do
so. This is more than satisfactory proof of technical issues with iCourt to permit the District
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Court to allow the filing date of Citizens' Petition to relate back to the date Citizens first filed the
document. This Court should uphold the District Court's allowance.
Therefore, even if this Court disagrees with Citizens' arguments above that the
initial filing was timely in and of itself, it is required by the Filing Rule to permit the filing date
of the Petition to relate back to the date of the Initial Filing. Filing Rule (e)(5)(A) (noting that
upon proof "the court shall permit ... " (emphasis added)).
Linscotts go further out on a limb to assert that the Petition was not timely filed,
and in doing so, ignore clear controlling precedent and make misleading statements and citations.
Idaho Code Section 67-6521(1)(d) is clear and unambiguous and provides a party twenty-eight
(28) days after administrative remedies have been exhausted to seek judicial review. The Court
need look no further, and the Linscotts ignore this unambiguous statutory language in an attempt
to muddy the waters. The District Court correctly shot down Linscotts' arguments.
Idaho Code Section 67-6521(1)(d) provides: "An affected person aggrieved by a
final decision concerning matters identified in section 67-6521(1)(a), Idaho Code, may within

twenty-eight (28) days after all remedies have been exhausted under local ordinances seek
judicial review as provided by chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code." LC. § 67-6521(1)(d) (emphasis
added).
The Bonner County Revised Code is the local ordinance here that sets procedures
for exhausting administrative remedies. Bonner County Revised Code section 12-263.A requires
persons affected by Board decisions to seek reconsideration before they can seek judicial review,
and notes that a failure to seek reconsideration is a failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
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Bonner County Revised Code ("BCRC") § 12-263.A. So, Citizens did not exhaust their
administrative remedies until they were denied reconsideration, and thus, by the plain language
of section 67-6521(1)(d), the twenty-eight day period to seek judicial review began running after
Citizens' motion for reconsideration was denied. To find otherwise would require ignoring plain
and unambiguous statutory language. Added to that, section 67-6535(2)(b) (which the Linscotts
argue applies (Linscotts Response at 32)) provides that an applicant "must first seek
reconsideration of the final decision within fourteen (14) days" and that the "twenty-eight (28)
day time frame for seeking judicial review is tolled until the date of the written decision
regarding reconsideration or the expiration of the sixty (60) day reconsideration period,
whichever occurs first." The Linscotts' ignore the plain language of the statute they cite to make
their argument.
Arthur v. Shoshone County (133 Idaho 854, 993 P.2d 617 (Idaho Ct. App. 2000))

affirms that Citizens' Petition was timely. In Arthur, the Idaho Court of Appeals made clear that
the twenty-eight day period to seek judicial review under section 67-6521(1)(d) begins running
after a petitioner exhausts his administrative remedies under local ordinances. Arthur, 133 Idaho
at 859-60, 993 P.2d at 622-23. In Arthur, there was no local ordinance that required Arthur to
move for reconsideration, but in this case there is: Bonner County Code 12-263.A. Because
Citizens' timely complied with its requirement to seek reconsideration, the twenty-eight day
period for it to seek judicial review did not begin running until the decision on that
reconsideration came down. Citizens' Petition was timely.
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The Linscotts erroneously cite Arthur for the proposition that Section
67-6521(1)(d) incorporates IDAPA's judicial review time limits, meaning that the time limit
begins running from the date of the initial decision, regardless of whether reconsideration is
sought. Linscotts Response at 32-34. The Linscotts are wrong, and their assertion is misstatement
of both the holding of Arthur and the plain language of the Local Land Use Planning Act
("LLUPA") and IDAPA. Linscotts' Response at 16, 32-34. 13 Arthur holds that the tolling
provisions of IDAP A do not apply to judicial review sought under LLUP A, precisely the
opposite of what the Linscotts cite it for. 14

13

In addition to their argument being directly refuted by statute and case law the Linscotts again
make claims they do not even attempt to back up with citation. They claim that section 67-6521(1)(d)'s
reference to chapter 52, title 67 is to section 67-5273 specifically. Linscotts Response at 32. But they
provide no reason nor argument why that reference does not point to other parts of chapter 52, title 67
dealing with judicial review such as section § 67-5272 (dealing with venue and the form of action),
7-5274 (stay), § 67-5275 (agency record), or § 67-5279 (scope of review and type of relief). Arthur
supports this latter interpretation.
14

For the Court's convenience, a more complete description of Arthur is as follows. In Arthur, the
petitioner, Arthur, sought a conditional use permit from Shoshone County, but it was denied, leading
Arthur to appeal to the board of county commissioners, which upheld the denial. 133 Idaho at 855, 993
P.2d at 618. Arthur then filed a motion for reconsideration in front of the board, but no local ordinance
provided for reconsideration, and the board was without authority to reconsider its decision. Id. (see n.1 ).
He waited more than twenty-eight days from the initial decision and filed a petition for judicial review,
arguing that it was timely because provisions of IDAPA (specifically section § 67-5246(4) and (5))
authorized reconsideration which tolled the twenty-eight day period set forth by section 67-6521(1)(d). Id.
This Court found Arthur's petition untimely, holding that the time limits for judicial review and tolling
provisions of IDAPA did not apply to cases brought under LLUPA. Id., 133 Idaho at 859-60, 993 P.2d at
622-23. Instead, the time limit for Arthur's LLUPA case was controlled by section § 67-652l(l)(d),
meaning that Arthur's petition should have been filed within twenty-eight days after the exhaustion of
Arthur's administrative remedies. Because the local ordinances at issue did not allow for reconsideration,
Arthur had exhausted his administrative remedies when the board issued its decision, and that exhaustion
of remedies began the twenty-eight day period. Id.
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The Linscotts similarly misstate IDAP A. Contrary to the Linscotts' argument, it
does not modify the clear and specific time frame established by section 67-6521(1)(d). Rather,
IDAP A provides that its paradigms for judicial review govern "unless other provision of law is

applicable to the particular matter." I.C. § 67-5270(1) (emphasis added). Here, another
provision of law is applicable to the time frame for seeking judicial review under LLUP A:
Section 67-6521(1)(d). So by its own language, IDAPA's provisions on the timing of judicial
review simply do not apply to this case. 15 Arthur confirms that IDAPA's timing provisions do
not apply to LLUPA. Arthur, 133 Idaho at 859-60, 993 P.2d at 622-23.
The time frame for Citizens to seek judicial review is clearly and unambiguously
set by section 67-6521(1)(d): twenty-eight days after administrative remedies have been
exhausted. Citizens met that deadline here. Despite being corrected on the meaning of the
analyzed statutes by the District Court (R. 290-91 ), the Linscotts copied and pasted their
misleading analysis before this Court. Their arguments are improper and should be ignored.

2.

Citizens' timely served all required parties.
Interstate and Linscott again assert this appeal must be denied because Citizens

did not serve them with the Petition. Interstate Response at 22; Linscotts Response at 36-37.
While Interstate's argument is relatively bare bones, the Linscotts' is more in depth and rife with
legal inaccuracies and incorrect and misleading citations.

15

Even if LC. § 67-5273 did apply, the Linscotts ignore subsection (2) thereof which provides that
the deadline to petition for judicial review, "if reconsideration is sought, [is] within twenty-eight (28)
days after the service date of the decision thereon."
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Linscotts state, without citation to authority, that "[ s]ervice is jurisdictional and
required to obtain jurisdiction to grant relief which affects a party." Linscotts Response at 37.
That is a misstatement of the law and directly contradicted by the plain language of Rule 84(n) of
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 16 Rule 84(n) provides:
The failure to physically file a petition for judicial review or cross-petition
for judicial review with the district court within the time limits prescribed
by statute and these rules is jurisdictional and will cause automatic
dismissal of the petition for judicial review on motion of any party, or on
initiative of the district court. Failure of a party to timely take any other
step in the process for judicial review [like service under Rule 84(d)] will
not be deemed jurisdictional, but may be grounds only for such other
action or sanction as the district court deems appropriate, which may
include dismissal of the petition for review.
I.R.C.P. 84(n) (emphasis added).
So even if Citizens had been required to serve Linscotts, any failure to do so was
expressly not jurisdictional. The remedy would be actions or sanctions the District Court deemed
appropriate. The District Court knew this and correctly determined that no action or sanctions
was appropriate for any alleged failure to serve here because there was no prejudice to the
Linscotts or Interstate. (R. 289-90.)
Neither Interstate nor Linscotts allege any prejudice, and it would be hard to see
how they could, given that they were afforded the full amount of time under the relevant rules to
consider and respond to Citizens' Petition below.

16

Even if the Linscotts' assertion were not legally unsound, this Court could not consider it because
the Linscotts failed to support it with authority or substantive argument. Bach, 148 Idaho at 790, 229 P .3d
at 1152.
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In any event, Citizens were not required to serve Linscotts or Interstate with the
Petition, as the only parties to this action at the time of initiation were Citizens and Bonner
County. Idaho Code Section 67-5201 defines parties as persons or entities named or admitted as
a party-initially Citizens and Bonner County-as well as entities "properly seeking and entitled
as of right to be admitted as a party." Linscott and/or Interstate had not indicated any intention to
seek to be admitted as parties until they moved to intervene below. The dispute as it was initiated
was between Bonner County, which issued a CUP, and Citizens, who opposed that CUP. Bonner
County initially denied Citizens' request to reconsider its Decision (A.R. 1137.) The parties to
that decision were Citizens and Bonner County as indicated in the Public Hearing Minutes which
identify Citizens as the appealing party, and Bonner County as the party providing a rebuttal
(A.R. 1137.) Other entities may and did have had an interest in the proceedings which would
allow their intervention, but as they had not yet intervened, they were not parties and were not
required to be served.

3.

The District Court correctly determined Citizens have standing.

In challenging the standing of the Citizens, the Linscotts and Interstate ignore
clear and unchallenged authority. Their arguments lack any legal foundation.
As a preliminary matter, the Linscotts repeatedly make assertions related to the
purpose of statutory provisions without citing any legal support for such opinions. For example,
the Linscotts baldly assert that the "new code provisions regarding unincorporated nonprofit
associations moved the statutory framework from that of partnership to that of an entity."
Linscotts' Response at 28-29. It cites nothing to support its proclamation of legislative intent.
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Linscotts' Response at 28-29. It further states that the "2015 statutory enactments repealed and
wholly replaced those provisions with the entity form, including as applicable to standing[,]" yet
the new and current statute says nothing at all about standing. See I.C. § 30-27-101, et seq. The
Court should ignore every legal assertion in the Response Briefs that is not supported by
authority. Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 790, 229 P.3d 1146, 1152 (2010) ("We will not
consider an issue not supported by argument and authority in the opening brief." 17 (internal
quotation omitted)).
LLUPA provides Citizens standing to maintain this lawsuit. Under LLUPA, a
party has standing to seek judicial review if the party is an "affected person aggrieved by a final
decision .... " Neighbors for Pres. of Big & Little Creek Cmty. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm 'rs of

Payette Cnty., 159 Idaho 182, 187, 358 P.3d 67, 72 (2015) (citing I.C. § 67-6521). An "affected
person" in tum, is a person having a "bona fide interest in real property which may be adversely
affected by: (i) The approval, denial or failure to act upon a[] ... special use permit and such
other similar applications required or authorized pursuant to this chapter" like the CUP at issue
here. I.C. § 67-6521(1)(a). Citizens have standing under LLUPA because, as an entity, it has a
bona fide interest in real property that may be adversely affected by the County's erroneously
issued CUP and the Decision upholding it.

17

This analysis is applicable here because, while the court in Bach case described an opening brief,
the Appellate Rules contain the same requirement that response briefs be supported by authority so the
reasoning applies equally. I.A.R. 35(b)(6).
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a.

The Decision prejudiced Citizens' substantial rights.

The Decision prejudices substantial rights of Citizens by negatively impacting the
use and enjoyment and the value of the real property owned by members of Citizens. 18 The
members of Citizens are all citizens who live close enough to the proposed plant to be negatively
impacted by it, many of whom live immediately adjacent to it, or within a mile of it. (See, e.g.,
A.R. at 830 (member who lives 1,200 ft. from the site); A.R. at 658 (member who lives right
next to site); A.R. at 779; A.R. at 857; A.R. at 979; A.R. at 1085-1088. 19)
A petitioner who opposes a governing board's decision to grant a permit must
show they are "in jeopardy of suffering substantial harm if the project goes forward, such as a
reduction in the opponent's land value or interference with his or her use or ownership of the
land." Hawkins v. Bonneville Cty. Bd. of Comm 'rs, 151 Idaho 228, 233, 254 P.3d 1224, 1229
(2011). Citizens' members are in such jeopardy here.
The proposed asphalt plant will negatively impact at least the following aspects of
the Citizens' real property, which in immediate vicinity of the Batch Plant:
•

The value of the members' real property. (See e.g., A.R. at 1039 and
referenced exhibits (Exh 1, subtitle 5); A.R. at 1041; A.R. at 1074)).

18

When the party petitioning for judicial review is an organization, it is sufficient to show that the
real property of at least one of its members will be affected. Coal. for Agric. 's Future v. Canyon Cty.,
160 Idaho 142, 147, 369 P.3d 920, 925 (2016).
19

The electronic signatures on these pages all correspond to the signors' respective addresses in the
vicinity of the site. Many of those addresses are within one mile of the proposed site (e.g. all the addresses
on Meadow Lane in Sagle, ID).
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•

The air quality on the members' real property. The proposed plant will
negatively impact the members' real property by creating adverse air
quality impacts and odors. (A.R. at 1038 (Exh. 1, subtitle 7); A.R. at 104142; A.R. at 1060-1065).

•

The ability to quietly enjoy the members' real property. The proposed
plant will create noise, vibrations, odors, and/or glare that will impact
surrounding properties. (A.R. at 1039; A.R. at 1066-1073).

•

The water quality on the members' real property. The proposed plant will
jeopardize the water quality of the surrounding area. (A.R. at 1027, 1045.)

Based on any of the above, Citizens has shown that the Decision puts the
members in jeopardy of suffering substantial harm. The District Court correctly reached this
conclusion. (R. 288-289.)
b.

Citizens, as an entity, has a bona fide interest in the real
property owned by its members through principles of
associational standing.

The standing of unincorporated nonprofit associations, like Citizens, is
determined using principles of associational standing, which means that Citizens have standing
because one or more of its members would have individual standing. Both the Linscotts and
Interstate argue that the passage of Idaho Code section § 30-27-105 somehow robs Citizens of
their associational standing because Citizens is treated as an entity distinct from its members.
They are wrong. Just as nonprofit corporations-entities distinct from their members that sue and
are sued in their own names-benefit from associational standing, so too do unincorporated
nonprofit associations like Citizens. The Linscotts and Interstate fail to cite case law for their
unsubstantiated assertion, but clear Idaho precedent defeats their position. The District Court
agreed.
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Standing is a judicial doctrine, and "Idaho has adopted the constitutionally based
federal justiciability standard" which encompasses the doctrine of associational standing. Zeyen

v. Pocatello/Chubbuck Sch. Dist. No. 25,451 P.3d 25, 32-33 (Idaho 2019) (noting incorporation
of federal standing standards); Thinket Ink Info. Res., Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 368 F.3d
1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2004) (describing associational standing). Under the associational standing
doctrine, "prudential standing exists for nonprofit corporations to file actions based on injuries
associated with their members." Thinket Ink Info. Res., Inc., 368 F.3d at 1059.
For this reason, in Selkirk-Priest Basin Ass 'n, Inc. v. State ex rel. Andrus,
127 Idaho 239, 899 P.2d 949 (1995), this Court determined that "principles of associational
standing" applied to the environmental groups who were parties to the appeal. 127 Idaho at 241,
899 P.2d at 951. That meant that the question of standing depended "on whether either the
environmental groups or the members of the environmental groups" had a sufficient interest.

Id., 127 Idaho at 242, 899 P.2d at 952 (emphases added). Those groups were fully incorporated
nonprofit associations, governed by the now-repealed Idaho Code section § 30-3-1 et seq. Id.,
127 Idaho at 239, 899 P.2d at 949 (noting in the caption that Selkirk-Priest Basin Association,
Inc., and the Idaho Environmental Council were both Idaho non-profit corporations). 20

20

To the extent further evidence of their status is needed, Citizens requests the Court take judicial
notice of the records of the Idaho Secretary of State pursuant to I.R.E. 201, which indicate the groups'
statuses as incorporated entities. Those records can be found by searching for the entities in question on
the Idaho Secretary of State's business search tool at https://sosbiz.idaho.gov/search/business.
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The same conclusion was reached in In re Jerome Cnty. Bd. of Comm 'rs,
153 Idaho 298, 308, 281 P.3d 1076, 1086 (2012)-where this Court applied associational
standing principles to incorporated nonprofit corporations, entities distinct from their members. 21
What the passage of the new nonprofit association law did was say what the
nonprofit corporation laws have said all along: the nonprofit entity is distinct from its members
and can sue and be sued in its own name. Associational standing principles have always applied
to nonprofit corporations, and continue to apply to unincorporated nonprofit associations under
the new statute. The District Court correctly found that associational standing principles grant
Citizens standing. (R. 288-289.)
c.

Citizens' bona fide interest in real property may be adversely
affected by the CUP and Decision, conferring standing to
maintain this action.

Interstate alleges that Citizens lack standing because they have only alleged the
possibility of harm or the invasion of a fundamental right of its members. Interstate Response at
14. In support of its assertion, Interstate relies upon Idaho Code Section § 67-6535(3), which
provides that "[ o]nly those whose challenge to a decision demonstrates actual harm or violation
of fundamental rights, not the mere possibility thereof, shall be entitled to a remedy or reversal of
a decision[.]"

21

The Linscotts cite the In re Jerome County case as authority for the proposition that incorporated
entities are to be treated differently from unincorporated nonprofit associations. In re Jerome County says
nothing of the sort. See 153 Idaho at 308,281 P.3d at 1086.
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This is a misstatement of the law and Interstate has either not read the controlling
authority or has ignored the parts thereof that do not support its position. This Court has directly
considered the precise language quoted by Interstate in the context of a standing challenge and
determined that the quoted language "cannot be construed as a standing requirement." Evans v.
Teton Cnty., 139 Idaho 71, 76, 73 P.3d 84, 89 (2003). 22 This Court went on to dictate that "[t]he

existence of real or potential harm is sufficient to challenge a land use decision." Id.
The existence of real or potential harm was demonstrated by Citizens in their
Petition and the proceedings below. (R. 160-161.) Citizens have proven the existence of real or
potential harm to many, if not all, of its members. (R. 160-161.). Far from merely alleging harm
"of a general nature, not particular to any individual member or his/her property" as alleged by
Interstate (Interstate's Response at 14), Citizens pointed to specific harm suffered by specific
members who own real property immediately adjacent to or within a mile of the proposed plant.
(R. 161.) Citizens have pointed to specific record citations that support that the Decision
negatively impacts: the value of Citizens' members' real property; the air quality of that real
property; the right to quietly enjoy that real property; and the water quality of that real property.
(R. 161.) The specific record citations provided by citizens contain direct and credible evidence
of the potential harms alleged.

22

Note that this Court there was interpreting a former version of LC. § 67-6535, but the language
discussed here was precisely the same as it is now, it was just found in subsection (c) as opposed to
subsection (3).
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Therefore, Citizens have demonstrated a bona fide interest in real property that
may be affected by the CUP and Decision. They have standing to bring this action.
III.

ATTORNEY FEES

Citizens are entitled to their attorney fees and Respondent/Intervenors are not. As
described in Citizens' Opening Brief, in this case Bonner County acted without a reasonable
basis in fact or law, and that entitles Citizens to their reasonable costs and fees incurred to date.
LC. § 12-117 (1 )-(2). Similarly, the Linscotts and Interstate have also acted without a reasonable
basis in fact or law. Citizens are entitled to obtain fees against intervenors pursuant to Idaho
Code Section 12-117. Rural Kootenai Org., Inc. v. Bd. of Comm 'rs, 133 Idaho 833, 846,
993 P.2d 596, 609 (1999) (citing section 12-117 and awarding appellate costs against an
intervenor aligned with a non-prevailing county). 23 As described above, neither Interstate nor the
Linscotts made any valid argument in opposition to Citizens' Petition. In many instances, they
misstated the law, omitted material statutory or rule provisions, cited to inapplicable cases, or
simply cited no authority whatsoever. Assertions without reference to legal or factual authority
are, by definition, without a reasonable basis in fact or law. Citizens are entitled to their
reasonable costs and fees in responding to them.
The Linscotts have not requested fees, and Interstate is not entitled to fees in this
case for several reasons. Interstate asserts that, as an intervenor, it may be awarded fees under

23

Citizens recognize that Rural Kootenai Org., Inc. has been called into question by a more recent
case which held that the "reference to LC. § 12-117 as a basis for the award of costs is mere dicta."
Neighbors For Responsible Growth v. Kootenai Cnty., 147 Idaho 173, 177, 207 P.3d 149, 153 (2009).
Because that language in Rural Kootenai Org., Inc. has not been overruled, Citizens raise it here.
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Idaho Code section§ 12-121 if it ends up as a prevailing party. Interstate's Response at 23. Here
again Interstate misstates the law. Clear Idaho precedent establishes that section 12-121 applies
only to "civil action[s]," and this judicial review proceeding is not a "civil action." Krempasky v.
Nez Perce Cnty. Planning & Zoning, 150 Idaho 231, 239, 245 P.3d 983, 991 (2010) ("A party

can only be awarded attorney fees under LC. § 12-121 in a 'civil action.' This is a petition for
judicial review from an administrative decision and thus is not a civil action. Thus, no attorney
fees will be awarded .... " (internal citations omitted)). Therefore, Linscotts are not entitled to
their costs or fees.
Even if the Linscotts cited the applicable code provision, section 12-117, they
would not be entitled to costs and fees because they are not an adverse party to the County as
required by that code sections. Sylte v. Idaho Dep't of Water Res., 165 Idaho 238, 443 P.3d 252,
261 (2019) ("While intervenors may request attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-117, this
statute still requires an entity and a state agency to be adverse parties .... Here, the Intervenors
prevailed on the issues but they were not adverse to IDWR."); Neighbors For Responsible
Growth, 147 Idaho at 177, 207 P.3d at 153 ("Furthermore, Appellants are intervenors on the side

of the county-perhaps the most obvious indicator that the two are not adverse. Thus, because
Appellants are not adverse to the county, they are not entitled to an award of attorney fees under
LC. § 12-117.")
Therefore, Citizens are entitled to their reasonable costs and attorney fees and
none of the Respondents/Intervenors are so entitled.
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IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above and in Citizens' Opening Brief, Citizens respectfully
requests that this Court reverse the Order of the District Court, set the Decision and CUP aside,
and award Citizens its reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in this proceeding.
Alternatively, Citizens requests this Court remand this case back to the District Court in light of
the recent developments regarding the invalidity of the Amendment.
Respectfully submitted on September 16, 2020.
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

By
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